SARS-CoV-2 outbreak among staff and evacuees at Operation Allies Welcome Safe Havens.

We report on five SARS-CoV-2 congregate setting outbreaks at U.S. Operation Allies Welcome Safe Havens/military facilities. Outbreak data were collected, and attack rates were calculated for various populations. Even in vaccinated populations, there was rapid spread, illustrating the importance of institutional prevention and mitigation policies in congregate settings.

Risk Assessment and Management of COVID-19 Among Travelers Arriving at Designated U.S. Airports, January 17-September 13, 2020.

In January 2020, with support from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), CDC instituted an enhanced entry risk assessment and management (screening) program for air passengers arriving from certain countries with widespread, sustained transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). The objectives of the screening program were to reduce the importation of COVID-19 cases into the United States and slow subsequent spread within states. Screening aimed to identify travelers with COVID-19-like illness or who had a known exposure to a person with COVID-19 and separate them from others. Screening also aimed to inform all screened travelers about self-monitoring and other recommendations to prevent disease spread and obtain their contact information to share with public health authorities in destination states. CDC delegated postarrival management of crew members to airline occupational health programs by issuing joint guidance with the Federal Aviation Administration.* During January 17-September 13, 2020, a total of 766,044 travelers were screened, 298 (0.04%) of whom met criteria for public health assessment; 35 (0.005%) were tested for SARS-CoV-2, and nine (0.001%) had a positive test result. CDC shared contact information with states for approximately 68% of screened travelers because of data collection challenges and some states' opting out of receiving data. The low case detection rate of this resource-intensive program highlighted the need for fundamental change in the U.S. border health strategy. Because SARS-CoV-2 infection and transmission can occur in the absence of symptoms and because the symptoms of COVID-19 are nonspecific, symptom-based screening programs are ineffective for case detection. Since the screening program ended on September 14, 2020, efforts to reduce COVID-19 importation have focused on enhancing communications with travelers to promote recommended preventive measures, reinforcing mechanisms to refer overtly ill travelers to CDC, and enhancing public health response capacity at ports of entry. More efficient collection of contact information for international air passengers before arrival and real-time transfer of data to U.S. health departments would facilitate timely postarrival public health management, including contact tracing, when indicated. Incorporating health attestations, predeparture and postarrival testing, and a period of limited movement after higher-risk travel, might reduce risk for transmission during travel and translocation of SARS-CoV-2 between geographic areas and help guide more individualized postarrival recommendations.

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Prevalence, Seroprevalence, and Exposure among Evacuees from Wuhan, China, 2020.

To determine prevalence of, seroprevalence of, and potential exposure to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) among a cohort of evacuees returning to the United States from Wuhan, China, in January 2020, we conducted a cross-sectional study of quarantined evacuees from 1 repatriation flight. Overall, 193 of 195 evacuees completed exposure surveys and submitted upper respiratory or serum specimens or both at arrival in the United States. Nearly all evacuees had taken preventive measures to limit potential exposure while in Wuhan, and none had detectable SARS-CoV-2 in upper respiratory tract specimens, suggesting the absence of asymptomatic respiratory shedding among this group at the time of testing. Evidence of antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 was detected in 1 evacuee, who reported experiencing no symptoms or high-risk exposures in the previous 2 months. These findings demonstrated that this group of evacuees posed a low risk of introducing SARS-CoV-2 to the United States.

Economic Impact of the 2015 MERS Outbreak on the Republic of Korea's Tourism-Related Industries.

The 2015 Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) outbreak in the Republic of Korea (ROK) is an example of an infectious disease outbreak initiated by international travelers to a high-income country. This study was conducted to determine the economic impact of the MERS outbreak on the tourism and travel-related service sectors, including accommodation, food and beverage, and transportation, in the ROK. We projected monthly numbers of noncitizen arrivals and indices of services for 3 travel-related service sectors during and after the MERS outbreak (June 2015 to June 2016) using seasonal autoregressive integrated moving average models. Tourism losses were estimated by multiplying the monthly differences between projected and actual numbers of noncitizen arrivals by average tourism expenditure per capita. Estimated tourism losses were allocated to travel-related service sectors to understand the distribution of losses across service sectors. The MERS outbreak was correlated with a reduction of 2.1 million noncitizen visitors corresponding with US$2.6 billion in tourism loss for the ROK. Estimated losses in the accommodation, food and beverage service, and transportation sectors associated with the decrease of noncitizen visitors were US$542 million, US$359 million, and US$106 million, respectively. The losses were demonstrated by lower than expected indices of services for the accommodation and food and beverage service sectors in June and July 2015 and for the transportation sector in June 2015. The results support previous findings that public health emergencies due to traveler-associated outbreaks of infectious diseases can cause significant losses to the broader economies of affected countries.

Economic Analysis of the Impact of Overseas and Domestic Treatment and Screening Options for Intestinal Helminth Infection among US-Bound Refugees from Asia.

BACKGROUND: Many U.S.-bound refugees travel from countries where intestinal parasites (hookworm, Trichuris trichuria, Ascaris lumbricoides, and Strongyloides stercoralis) are endemic. These infections are rare in the United States and may be underdiagnosed or misdiagnosed, leading to potentially serious consequences. This evaluation examined the costs and benefits of combinations of overseas presumptive treatment of parasitic diseases vs. domestic screening/treating vs. no program. METHODS: An economic decision tree model terminating in Markov processes was developed to estimate the cost and health impacts of four interventions on an annual cohort of 27,700 U.S.-bound Asian refugees: 1) "No Program," 2) U.S. "Domestic Screening and Treatment," 3) "Overseas Albendazole and Ivermectin" presumptive treatment, and 4) "Overseas Albendazole and Domestic Screening for Strongyloides". Markov transition state models were used to estimate long-term effects of parasitic infections. Health outcome measures (four parasites) included outpatient cases, hospitalizations, deaths, life years, and quality-adjusted life years (QALYs). RESULTS: The "No Program" option is the least expensive ($165,923 per cohort) and least effective option (145 outpatient cases, 4.0 hospitalizations, and 0.67 deaths discounted over a 60-year period for a one-year cohort). The "Overseas Albendazole and Ivermectin" option ($418,824) is less expensive than "Domestic Screening and Treatment" ($3,832,572) or "Overseas Albendazole and Domestic Screening for Strongyloides" ($2,182,483). According to the model outcomes, the most effective treatment option is "Overseas Albendazole and Ivermectin," which reduces outpatient cases, deaths and hospitalization by around 80% at an estimated net cost of $458,718 per death averted, or $2,219/$24,036 per QALY/life year gained relative to "No Program". DISCUSSION: Overseas presumptive treatment for U.S.-bound refugees is a cost-effective intervention that is less expensive and at least as effective as domestic screening and treatment programs. The addition of ivermectin to albendazole reduces the prevalence of chronic strongyloidiasis and the probability of rare, but potentially fatal, disseminated strongyloidiasis.

CDC's Early Response to a Novel Viral Disease, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV), September 2012-May 2014.

The first ever case of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) was reported in September 2012. This report describes the approaches taken by CDC, in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other partners, to respond to this novel virus, and outlines the agency responses prior to the first case appearing in the United States in May 2014. During this time, CDC's response integrated multiple disciplines and was divided into three distinct phases: before, during, and after the initial activation of its Emergency Operations Center. CDC's response to MERS-CoV required a large effort, deploying at least 353 staff members who worked in the areas of surveillance, laboratory capacity, infection control guidance, and travelers' health. This response built on CDC's experience with previous outbreaks of other pathogens and provided useful lessons for future emerging threats.

Management of latent Mycobacterium tuberculosis infection: WHO guidelines for low tuberculosis burden countries.

Latent tuberculosis infection (LTBI) is characterised by the presence of immune responses to previously acquired Mycobacterium tuberculosis infection without clinical evidence of active tuberculosis (TB). Here we report evidence-based guidelines from the World Health Organization for a public health approach to the management of LTBI in high risk individuals in countries with high or middle upper income and TB incidence of <100 per 100 000 per year. The guidelines strongly recommend systematic testing and treatment of LTBI in people living with HIV, adult and child contacts of pulmonary TB cases, patients initiating anti-tumour necrosis factor treatment, patients receiving dialysis, patients preparing for organ or haematological transplantation, and patients with silicosis. In prisoners, healthcare workers, immigrants from high TB burden countries, homeless persons and illicit drug users, systematic testing and treatment of LTBI is conditionally recommended, according to TB epidemiology and resource availability. Either commercial interferon-gamma release assays or Mantoux tuberculin skin testing could be used to test for LTBI. Chest radiography should be performed before LTBI treatment to rule out active TB disease. Recommended treatment regimens for LTBI include: 6 or 9 month isoniazid; 12 week rifapentine plus isoniazid; 3-4 month isoniazid plus rifampicin; or 3-4 month rifampicin alone.

Airport exit and entry screening for Ebola--August-November 10, 2014.

In response to the largest recognized Ebola virus disease epidemic now occurring in West Africa, the governments of affected countries, CDC, the World Health Organization (WHO), and other international organizations have collaborated to implement strategies to control spread of the virus. One strategy recommended by WHO calls for countries with Ebola transmission to screen all persons exiting the country for "unexplained febrile illness consistent with potential Ebola infection." Exit screening at points of departure is intended to reduce the likelihood of international spread of the virus. To initiate this strategy, CDC, WHO, and other global partners were invited by the ministries of health of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to assist them in developing and implementing exit screening procedures. Since the program began in August 2014, an estimated 80,000 travelers, of whom approximately 12,000 were en route to the United States, have departed by air from the three countries with Ebola transmission. Procedures were implemented to deny boarding to ill travelers and persons who reported a high risk for exposure to Ebola; no international air traveler from these countries has been reported as symptomatic with Ebola during travel since these procedures were implemented.

Presumptive treatment and medical screening for parasites in refugees resettling to the United States.

More than 50,000 refugees are resettled to the United States annually, many from areas highly endemic for parasites. Some of these infections present little clinical consequence after migration, but others are responsible for morbidity and mortality. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has issued predeparture presumptive treatment and postarrival medical guidelines for the management of parasites. Although these guidelines are evidence based, there remain significant challenges to presumptive treatment programs in refugees. Gaps in the evidence continue; resettling populations are continually changing, thus altering the epidemiology; and there are logistical and cost barriers to fully implementing recommendations. This article will review the evolution and status of current guidelines, as well as identify gaps and challenges to full implementation. It is imperative for clinicians serving this population to be familiar with interventions received by refugees, since previous treatment will impact screening, diagnostic evaluation, and treatment decisions.

US Civilian Smallpox Preparedness and Response Program, 2003.

Variola virus, the cause of smallpox disease, has been deemed a possible bioterrorism agent. Since November 2001, federal, state, and local public health partners implemented activities to prepare for a possible smallpox outbreak. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) produced and delivered training and educational materials for smallpox preparedness in many formats, developed detailed smallpox vaccine information statements about vaccine contraindications and vaccination site care, and established mechanisms to monitor and respond to adverse events after smallpox vaccination. The last included enhancements to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System, a pregnancy registry for inadvertently vaccinated pregnant women, and a Clinician Telephone Information Line to collect reports about adverse events. The civilian responder vaccination program was conducted with rigorous safety procedures, and few historically recognized adverse events were observed. However, myocarditis and/or pericarditis was newly recognized as an adverse event caused by the New York City Board of Health vaccinia vaccine strain. This smallpox preparedness program put into place a number of measures to advance the United States' readiness for a smallpox outbreak that have assisted in preparedness for other threats.

A case of naturally acquired inhalation anthrax: clinical care and analyses of anti-protective antigen immunoglobulin G and lethal factor.

This report describes the first case of naturally acquired inhalation anthrax in the United States since 1976. The patient's clinical course included adjunctive treatment with human anthrax immunoglobulin. Clinical correlation of serologic assays for the lethal factor component of lethal toxin and anti-protective antigen immunoglobulin G are also presented.

Safety profile of smallpox vaccine: insights from the laboratory worker smallpox vaccination program.

BACKGROUND: The frequency of mild-to-moderate adverse events following smallpox vaccination was not well documented or reported during the pre-eradication era. This report describes the frequency of such symptoms among 936 adult smallpox vaccinees with and without a history of prior smallpox vaccination. METHODS: Diary cards were distributed to 1006 laboratory workers and members of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) smallpox response team who received smallpox vaccination under an investigational new drug protocol during 2001-2002. Vaccinees were requested to complete the diary card daily and return it to the CDC 28 days after vaccination. The proportion of vaccinees reporting symptoms was determined and compared among subgroups. RESULTS: Ninety-three percent of the diary cards were returned. The most common symptom reported was "itching at vaccination site." Primary vaccines reported statistically higher proportions of the following 11 symptoms: joint pain (25% vs. 11%; P=.0011), muscle pain (46% vs. 19%; P<.0001), fatigue (43% vs. 29%; P=.0161), swelling at vaccination site (58% vs. 33%; P<.0001), itching on the body (31% vs. 17%; P=.0048), abdominal pain (11% vs. 2%; P=.0012), swollen or tender lymph nodes (71% vs. 33%; P<.0001), pain at injection site (48% vs. 30%; P=.0018), headache (40% vs. 25%; P=.0088), backache (17% vs. 7%; P=.0090), and fever (temperature, >or=100 degrees F [37.7 degrees C]; 20% vs. 9%; P=.0047). CONCLUSIONS: This analysis suggests that previously unvaccinated persons aged <30 years experienced more symptoms than did previously vaccinated persons. The findings of increased proportions with joint pain, abdominal pain, backache, and difficulty breathing were unexpected. As with recently described cardiac adverse events, these symptoms are suggestive of systemic involvement and warrant further study.

Advances in detecting and responding to threats from bioterrorism and emerging infectious disease.

Much progress has been made in recent years to strengthen local, state, national and international capacities to detect and respond to bioterrorism events and naturally occurring outbreaks of disease. New tools and systems are available to estimate the potential impact of a biological event and predict resource needs for effective response, enable earlier detection of an attack or outbreak, enhance diagnostic capacity and facilitate rapid intervention to mitigate the impact of an event on a community. These advances have required new approaches to preparedness, planning and surveillance, as well as new partnerships and collaborations across a range of disciplines. We examine some of these developments, discuss potential uses and limitations of these approaches, and identify priorities for the future.

Recommendations for using smallpox vaccine in a pre-event vaccination program. Supplemental recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) and the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC).

This report supplements the 2001 statement by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) (CDC. Vaccinia [smallpox] vaccine: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP], 2001. MMWR 2001;50[No. RR-10]:1-25). This supplemental report provides recommendations for using smallpox vaccine in the pre-event vaccination program in the United States. To facilitate preparedness and response, smallpox vaccination is recommended for persons designated by public health authorities to conduct investigation and follow-up of initial smallpox cases that might necessitate direct patient contact. ACIP recommends that each state and territory establish and maintain > or = 1 smallpox response team. ACIP and the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC) recommend that each acute-care hospital identify health-care workers who can be vaccinated and trained to provide direct medical care for the first smallpox patients requiring hospital admission and to evaluate and manage patients who are suspected as having smallpox. When feasible, the first-stage vaccination program should include previously vaccinated health-care personnel to decrease the potential for adverse events. Additionally persons administering smallpox vaccine in this pre-event vaccination program should be vaccinated. Smallpox vaccine is administered by using the multiple-puncture technique with a bifurcated needle, packaged with the vaccine and diluent. According to the product labeling, 2-3 punctures are recommended for primary vaccination and 15 punctures for revaccination. A trace of blood should appear at the vaccination site after 15-20 seconds; if no trace of blood is visible, an additional 3 insertions should be made by using the same bifurcated needle without reinserting the needle into the vaccine vial. If no evidence of vaccine take is apparent after 7 days, the person can be vaccinated again. Optimal infection-control practices and appropriate site care should prevent transmission of vaccinia virus from vaccinated health-care workers to patients. Health-care personnel providing direct patient care should keep their vaccination sites covered with gauze in combination with a semipermeable membrane dressing to absorb exudates and to provide a barrier for containment of vaccinia virus to minimize the risk of transmission; the dressing should also be covered by a layer of clothing. Dressings used to cover the site should be changed frequently to prevent accumulation of exudates and consequent maceration. The most critical measure in preventing contact transmission is consistent hand hygiene. Hospitals should designate staff to assess dressings for all vaccinated health-care workers. When feasible, staff responsible for dressing changes for smallpox health-care teams should be vaccinated, all persons handling dressings should observe contact precautions. Administrative leave is not required routinely for newly vaccinated health-care personnel unless they are physically unable to work as a result of systemic signs and symptoms of illness; have extensive skin lesions that cannot be adequately covered or if they are unable to adhere to the recommended infection-control precautions. Persons outside the patient-care setting can keep their vaccination sites covered with a porous dressing hand hygiene remains key to preventing inadvertent inoculation. FDA has recommended that recipients of smallpox vaccine be deferred from donating blood for 21 days or until the scab has separated. Contacts of vaccinees, who have inadvertently contracted vaccinia, also should be deferred from donating blood for 14 days after complete resolution of their complication. In the pre-event vaccination program, smallpox vaccination is contraindicated for persons with a history or presence of eczema or atopic dermatitis; who have other acute, chronic, or exfoliative skin conditions; who have conditions associated with immunosuppression; are aged < 1 year; who have a serious allergy to any component of the vaccine; or who are pregnant or breastfeeding. ACIP does not recommend smallpox vaccination for children and adolescents aged < 18 years during the pre-event vaccination program. Pre-event vaccination also is contraindicated among persons with household contacts who have a history or presence of eczema or atopic dermatitis; who have other acute, chronic, or exfoliative skin conditions; who have conditions associated with immunosuppression; or who are pregnant. For purposes of screening for contraindications for pre-event vaccination, household contacts include persons with prolonged intimate contact (e.g., sexual contacts) with the potential vaccinee and others who might have direct contact with the vaccination site. Persons with inflammatory eye disease might be at increased risk for inadvertent inoculation as a result of touching or rubbing the eye. Therefore, deferring vaccination is prudent for persons with inflammatory eye diseases requiring steroid treatment until the condition resolves and the course of therapy is complete. Eczema vaccinatum, a serious form of disseminated vaccinia infection, can occur among persons with atopic dermatitis and other dermatologic conditions. Potential vaccinees should be queried regarding the diagnosis of atopic dermatitis or eczema in themselves or any member of their household, or regarding the presence of chronic or recurrent rashes consistent with these diagnoses. Persons reporting such a rash in themselves or household members should not be vaccinated, unless a health-care provider determines that the rash is not eczema or atopic dermatitis. Before vaccination, women of childbearing age should be asked if they are pregnant or intend to become pregnant during the next 4 weeks; women who respond positively should not be vaccinated. Any woman who thinks she might be pregnant or who wants additional assurance that she is not pregnant should perform a urine pregnancy test on the day scheduled for vaccination. If a pregnant woman is inadvertently vaccinated or if she becomes pregnant within 4 weeks after smallpox vaccination, she should be counseled regarding concerns for the fetus. Vaccination during pregnancy should not ordinarily be a reason to terminate pregnancy. CDC has established a pregnancy registry to prospectively follow the outcome of such pregnancies and facilitate the investigation of any adverse pregnancy outcome among pregnant women who were inadvertently vaccinated. For enrollment in the registry, contact CDC at 404-639-8253. Smallpox vaccine should not be administered to persons with human immunodeficiency virus infection (HIV) or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) as part of a pre-event program because of their increased risk for progressive vaccinia. HIV testing is recommended for persons who have any history of a risk factor for HIV infection or for anyone who is concerned that he or she might have HIV infection. HIV testing should be available in a confidential or anonymous setting, in accordance with local laws and regulations, with results communicated to the potential vaccinee before the planned date of vaccination. Smallpox vaccine can be administered simultaneously with any inactivated vaccine. With the exception of varicella vaccine, smallpox vaccine can be administered simultaneously with other live-virus vaccines. To avoid confusion in ascertaining which vaccine might have caused postvaccination skin lesions or other adverse events, varicella vaccine and smallpox vaccine should be administered >4 weeks apart. Health-care workers scheduled to receive an annual purified protein derivative (PPD) skin test for tuberculosis screening should not receive the skin test until >1 month after smallpox vaccination. Persons with progressive vaccinia, eczema vaccinatum, and severe generalized vaccinia or inadvertent inoculation might benefit from therapy with VIG or cidofovir, although the latter has not been approved by FDA for this indication. Suspected cases of these illnesses or other severe adverse events after smallpox vaccination should be reported immediately to state health departments. VIG and cidofovir are available from CDC under Investigational New Drug protocols. Clinically severe adverse events after smallpox vaccination should be reported to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System. Reports can be made online at https://secure.vaers.org/VaersDataEntryintro.htm, or by postage-paid form, which is available by calling 800-822-7967 (toll-free). ACIP will review these recommendations periodically as new information becomes available related to smallpox disease, smallpox vaccines, the risk of smallpox attack, smallpox vaccine adverse events, and the experience gained as recent recommendations are implemented. Revised recommendations will be developed as needed.